This paper studies a principal-agent r elationship with moral hazard in which the principal or the supervisor can monitor the agent's hidden action by using identical monitoring technologies. The paper shows that delegation of monitoring to the supervisor is protable because of two eects. With delegation the principal can better regulate t he incentives (incentive eect) and can commit to wage structures to w hich she could not commit without delegation (commitment e ect). As a logical step collusion is introduced and it is shown that even with the possibility of collusion delegati o n i s a n optimal strategy. JEL Classication: D82, L23
Introduction
Standard agency theory tells us that optimal incentive s c hemes make use of all available information related to the agent's performance. Hart and Holmstr om (1987) see in this sucient statistic result \the main predictive content of the basic agency model". They conclude that \agency relationships create a demand for monitoring". Principals are interested i n m onitoring, since i t creates information about the agent's behavior. Tirole (1986) , h o w e v e r, notes that if m onitoring is performed b y a third party (the supervisor) then new problems can arise. The supervisor has his o wn interests and these may b e i n c o n i c t w i th the principal's. Tirole introduces the possibility o f c ollusion between the supervisor and the agent and shows that it limits the scope of implementable c ontracts.
other hand, she must set incentives in order for monitoring to take p l ace, since the agent will not choose a high eort level when m onitoring does not occur. When the principal does not delegate monitoring she has only one contract through which s h e c an regulate both incentives. If the principal delegates monitoring, then she has also the contract o f t h e s u p e r v i sor by which she can create incentives. The idea that in a principal-agent relationship with monitoring the principal has to create two t ypes of incentives is not new. Khalil (1991) studies a model in which the principal can audit the agent's action ex post. 1 The paper shows that if the principal cannot commit t o a u d i ting ex a n te, then the principal has to design contracts in such a w a y that she will have incentives to audit e x -post. Khalil c l aims that the model is equivalent to a "three-person scenario" with three physically distinct players: a player who designs the contract, an agent w h o c hooses an action and a third player who decides whether to audit the agent's action. In our context this claim is not correct.
Second, it is assumed that information which r e sults from the monitoring procedure is private. This implies that the monitor has to decide whether t o m ake the information public or to withhold it. When the principal delegates monitoring, she cannot commit to revealing information which will h urt her. She can therefore not use a carrot and stick approach, because she will not reveal information which forces her to hand out the carrots. If the principal delegates monitoring commitment to a carrot and stick approach is possible and, as we show, optimal. Delegation has therefore also a commitment eect. We show that with delegation the principal is able to approximate the rst best solution by setting wage dierences which tend to innity. It is then argued that this i m plies that there are large benets from side-contracting (collusion) and that it i s u n r e alistic to assume that under these extreme c i rcumstances collusion will not take p l ace. A s a l ogical step w e , therefore, introduce the possibility o f c o s t l y collusion, which e nables us to 1 Note that we a ssume that the agent's action and the monitoring decision are chosen simultaneously rather than sequentially. In this respect it i s i lluminating to stress the dierence between auditing, which t ypically occurs after an action has been taken, and monitoring which occurs while an action i s taken or a task is being performed. parameterize the degree of commitment. It is shown that even without the commitment eect d e legation is still protable d u e t o the incentive e ect m entioned above.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model. Section 3 analyzes the game when the principal acts as monitor. Section 4 studies the game when the principal delegates monitoring to the supervisor. Section 5 and 6 study dierent aspects of collusion. Section 7 concludes.
The Model
The game i s p l a y e d b y three risk neutral players: a principal, a supervisor and an agent. All p l a y e rs have the objective t o m aximize their expected p a y o. Outside options of the supervisor and agent are normalized to zero. Both players are also protected by l i m i ted liability. They cannot be forced to make positive transfers to the principal.
The agent i s e m ployed b y the principal's rm. H e has the choice between w orking at a high eort level a H and working at a low e ort level a L . The parameter a i (i = H; L) represents the disutility o f e ort in m onetary terms. It i s assumed that the agent dislikes eort, which i m plies that 1a a H 0 a L > 0. The eort of the agent i s not observable.
As the owner of the rm the principal receives the output resulting from the agent's eort. A high output y H results when the agent's eort is a H . The principal receives a l o w output y L when the agent's action is a L , where 1y y H 0 y L > 0. Output occurs after the agent h a s e xerted his eort. We assume that the principal captures the output directly a n d c annot produce hard evidence on the total output received. Output is therefore also not observable.
We assume that a costly monitoring technology is a v ailable. The technology is controlled by t he monitor, who can either be the principal or the supervisor. If the monitor decides to monitor, he rst has to pay a c ost c > 0. After paying the cost the action of the agent i s revealed with a probability . Note that the monitoring procedure is imperfect i n the sense that not always a result is obtained. If, however , a r e sult i s obtained then the monitor has hard evidence about the agent's action. The evidence is private to the monitor, but when i t i s r e v ealed, it i s v eriable b y a t h i rd party.
The monitoring procedure itself i s not veriable. It cannot be checked by the players whether the monitor actually p a i d the cost c and monitored. Therefore, if the monitor claims t h a t n o t h i ng was observed from the monitoring process, then this can have three causes. It might be that the monitor did not monitor at all. It m a y h a v e happened that the monitor did m onitor, but did not get a result. Or, it might be that the monitor did monitor and got a result, but did not reveal it. The only veriable states of the world in the model are therefore the following. State H: It is revealed that the agent's action was a H . State L: It is revealed that the agent's action was a L . State N: N othing is revealed about the action of the agent.
The principaloers a contract w to the agent and a contract t to the supervisor, where a contract is a set of contingent transfers from the principal to a certain player covering all veriable states of the world. Together with the assumption of limited liability the general form of a feasible c o n tract i s w ( w H ; w L ; w N ) 2 I R 3 + a n d t ( t H ; t L ; t N ) 2 I R 3 + .
B e f o re presenting the timing of the game w e recapitulate the main assumptions of our principal-agent m odel. The agent's action and the resulting output are unveriable. Costly m onitoring can be performed by e ither the principal or the supervisor and is also unveriable. Only the result of monitoring is v eriable, but in rst instance private information to the person who monitored.
The timing of the game i s as follows:
t=0: The p r incipal assigns the monitoring technology to herself or to the supervisor.
t=1: The principal oers a contract w to the agent and a contract t to the supervisor.
t=2: The supervisor and agent decide whether to accept the contract.
t=3: The agent and the monitor play a simultaneous move g a m e. The agent c hooses the high or the low a c tion (a H or a L ). The monitor decides whether t o m onitor or not (M or N).
t=4: In the case of monitoring, nature reveals the true action to the monitor with probability .
t=5: If nature revealed the agent's action-decision, the monitor decides whether to make the obtained i nformation public o r t o w i thhold i t.
t=6: Payos are realized.
The informational structure is such that except for the monitor's and the agent's decision and the fact whether nature revealed anything in step 4 all variables and parameters are common knowledge between the players.
We look for subgame perfect e quilibria of the game b y taking the following procedure. First, we consider the case in which the principal has control over the monitoring technology. W e c all this \the game without delegation". We c haracterize the optimal contract and compute the maximum payo to the principal. S e cond, we study the case in which t he principal delegates m onitoring to the supervisor and refer to this subgame as \the game with delegation". We t h e n compare and investigate whether b y delegation the principal can achieve a h i gher p a y o.
We are interested i n comparing the costs of implementing the action a H when the principal acts as monitor and when the supervisor controls the monitoring technology. Therefore we assume that parameters are such that the principal prefers to implement the action a H with at least some positive probability under both policies. This w i ll be the case if the dierence 1y is l arge enough.
As a benchmark consider the case in w h i c h the agent's a c t ion is observable and veriable. It i s o b vious that in this case the principal can appropriate the entire surplus from the action a H without the use of the costly monitoring technology. B y conditioning the contracts on the observed action she can attain the rst best outcome U P = y H 0 a H . A similar result obtains when we assume that output is veriable.
When eort and output are not veriable the action a H can only b e i nduced when monitoring takes p l ace. Without monitoring the only state which c an occur is the state N. The most general contract is a one-dimensional wage w = w N 2 I R + . Consequently, the principal cannot induce the agent to take t he action a H and her maximum payo in this case is U P = y L 0 a L .
The Game without Delegation
In this section we analyze the game i n which the principal controls the monitoring technology. W e show that in this setting it is optimal for the principal to induce the agent t o t a k e the high action with probability one. When the monitoring technology is inecient this requires that the principal has to monitor with probability one and that a rent i s l eft to the agent. When the monitoring technolo g y i s r e l atively ecient, it is possible for the principal to induce the high action without full m onitoring. In the optimum the agent r e ceives h i s reservationwage and monitoring occurs with a probability less than one.
If the principal does not delegate the monitoring decision then the game i s p l a y ed by the principal and the agent o n l y . The supervisor plays no role and we can set his contract t o t = ( 0 ; 0 ; 0). In the rest of this section the supervisor will b e d i sregarded.
Suppose that the principal decides to m onitor and that monitoring is successful. This means that the principal has the veriable evidence that the agent's action was a i (i = H;L). In stage 5 of the game she has to decide whether to reveal the evidence. The decision directly a e cts her payos. Concealing the evidence r e sults in a payment o f w N , while revealing the information results in a p a yment o f w i . The principal will therefore only reveal the evidence, if w N w i . 2 This observation has an important i m plication. The principal cannot credibly commit to rewarding the agent for taking the action a H by setting w H > w N . I n t he existing principal-agent l i terature with monitoring, however, it is often obtained that in this setting it is optimal for the principal to use a carrot and stick approach (e.g. Border and Sobel (1987) , Mookerhjee and Png (1989) ). Here such 2 Without loss of generality w e adopt the tie-breaking rule that the principal reveals her evidence when she is indierent. a s c heme i s not possible.
The following proposition shows that we can restrict our attention to contracts of the form w N w H and w N w L . T h i s i m plies that in stage 5 the principal will always reveal her information.
Proposition 1 Without loss of generality we may assume that the optimal contract w satises the conditions w N w H and w N w L and induces full revelation of the principal's monitoring evidence.
Proof: We prove that any p a y o associated with a contract which d o e s n o t s p e cify w N w H and w N w L can also be attained by a contract which does satisfy the conditions. L e t a c ontract w = ( w H ; w N ; w L ) b e s u c h t h a t for some i = H;L we h a v e w i > w N . I f the principal monitors and obtains the result a i , she will decide not to reveal it. Instead of paying w i the principal will p a y the lower wage w N . The payos associated with the contract w are therefore identical to that of the contract w By restricting attention to c ontracts which specify w N w H and w N w L stage 5 of the game b e comes redundant. Any result which is obtained from the monitoring process is automatically revealed. As a consequence the subgame as of stage 3 is r e duced to a simultaneous move g a m e w i th two actions for each player. The strategy space of the principal is S P = fM;Ng, while the strategy space of the agent i s S A = f a H ; a L g . Let 2 [0;1] represent the probability that the principal monitors. Similarly, l et 2 [0;1] denote the probability that the agent takes the action a H , then the payo functions are
We can now identify a Nash equilibrium as a pair ( 3 ; 3 ) s u c h that Let N (w) be the set of Nash equilibria for a given w age contract w. The combination (w;;) is f e asible i f i t satises the following constraints. S i m ilarly, w e s a y that the contract w is feasible if there exists a strategy pair (;) 2 N(w) such that the combination (w;;) is feasible. A subgame p e rfect e quilibrium outcome of the game w i thout delegation can now be dened as a feasible outcome (w 3 ; 3 ; 3 )suchthatthere d o e s not exist a feasible contract w 0 for which U P (w 3 ; 3 ; 3 ) < U P (w 0 ; 0 ; 0 ) for all ( ) . I t f o llows that a solution (w 3 ; 3 ; 3 ) to the following maximization problem is a subgame p e rfect equilibrium outcome o f t he game without delegation.
First consider those contracts w which induce an equilibrium in pure strategies. By assumption it i s protable to implement the action a H with at least some positive probability. Since the agent w i ll only take the action a H if monitoring occurs, the only t ype of pure equilibrium which m a y b e i nduced by an optimal contract w 3 is the equilibrium = = 1. In the pure equilibrium the payo to the principal is U P = y H 0w H 0(1 0)w N 0c, while the payo to the agent equals U A = w H + (1 0 )w N 0 a H . For the pure actions to constitute an equilibrium it must be that given the contract w the principal prefers monitoring given that the agent takes the actiona H . This i m plies that the wage structure is such that y H 0 w H 0 (1 0 )w N 0 c y H 0 w N , or equivalently
(1)
Note that this c ondition ensures that w N w H . Likewise, given that the principal monitors, the agent has to prefer the action a H over a L . This requires
One more condition which n e eds to be fullled is that the contract is individually rational for the agent. The individual rationality constraint i s
Lemma 1 If the optimal contract induces a pure e quilibrium, then we may assume without loss of generality that the optimal c ontract w satises the conditions w L = 0 and w N = w H + c=. Proof: We show that the payo, associated w i th any contract w which induces a pure equilibrium, c an also be attained by a contract w Q.E.D.
Thesecond type of equilibrium consists of equilibria in whichbothplayers are indierent about their actions. Let the principal monitor with probability , then the agent i s indierent b e t w een his two a c tions when
Similarly, l et the agent c hoose the action a H with probability . The principal is willing to randomize, when her payo from monitoring equals her payo from not monitoring. It follows that the principal is indierent if and only if
Of course, the contract w must be such that ; 2 [0;1]. Furthermore, the individual rationality c onstraint of the agent i s w H + ( 1 0 ) w L + ( 1 0 )w N a H + ( 1 0 ) a L or by equation (4),
Lemma 2 If the optimal contract w induces an equilibrium (;) in which both players are indierent then for the optimal contract it holds that w L = 0 and w N = w H + c=. Proof: If the optimal contract induces an equilibrium in which both players are indifferent then the principal's payo is U P (w;;) = y H + ( 10 ) y L 0 w N . The individual rationality constraint ( 6 ) i s independent o f w L . S i nce @=@w L 0, the objective function is decreasing in w L . It is therefore optimal to set w L as low a s p o s s i ble, i . e. w L = 0. By assumption we h a v e that U P (w;;) i s l arger than y L 0 a L , which i m plies that w N < 1y0a L . Together w i th the condition w H w N , it f o l lows that w H < 1y 1y. Now rewrite the principal's payo as Two more types o f e quilibria need t o b e d i scussed. First, the equilibrium in which the principal has a strict preference f o r m onitoring ( = 1), while the agent is indierent and chooses the action a H with a probability s m aller than one ( < 1). Obviously, this equilibrium cannot be sustained by an optimal contract. By increasing the wage w H only slightly, the agent c hooses = 1 i n e q uilibrium and the principal's payo increases.
The fourth type of equilibrium consists of equilibria i n w h i c h the agent has a strict preference for the action a H (i.e. = 1), while the principal is indierent. A contract w which induces s u c h an equilibrium must satisfy the constraint w H = w N +c=. Note that also in this t y pe of equilibrium the payos are independent o f w L and we m a y assume that w L = 0 . W e therefore conclude that an optimal contract satises the constraints w L = 0 a n d w H = w N + c=. W e c an now derive the optimal contract w Proof: For a solution (w 3 ; 3 ; 3 ) i t holds that w 3 N = w 3 H + c= and consequently 3 = 1. In the optimum the principal is therefore indierent b e t w e en her actions. It follows that her payo U P = y H 0 c= 0 w H is decreasing in w H . The principal's payo is, therefore, bounded b y the constraint w H 1a= or the individual rationality constraint, whichever binds rst given that w 3 N = w 3 H + c=. Note that a binding individual rationality constraint together with the condition w N = w H + c= requires that w H = (a H 0 c + q 4(1a)c + ( c 0 a H ) 2 ) = (2). This is larger than or equal to 1a= if and only if (1a + c)=(a H + c). This proves the proposition.
Q.E.D.
The proposition states that in the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome ( w 3 ; 3 ; 3 ) the agent c hooses the action a H with probability o n e . A second conclusion is that the eciency o f m onitoring plays an important r o l e. In order t o i nduce the agent t o t a k e the action a H the principal has to monitor. In the optimum monitoring occurs with probability one if the monitoring technology is relatively inecient, i.e. when < (1a + c)=(a H + c). In this case the payo to the principal is less than y H 0 a H 0 c. Due to the inecient m onitoring technology the principal cannot extract the whole surplus from the relationship and must leave a r e n t to the agent. If the probability o f successful monitoring () i s larger than (1a + c)=(a H + c) then monitoring occurs with a probability l e ss than one in equilibrium. The payo to the principal is larger than y H 0 a H 0 c. The monitoring technology in this case is ecient enough to extract the whole s u r plus and the agent d o e s n o t r e ceive a rent.
The Game with Delegation
In this section we analyze the game i n which the principal delegates monitoring to the supervisor. We show that with delegation the principal can approximate the rst best solution. This is possible when the principal oers an innite wage to the agent when the high action is observed and she sets further wages in such a w a y that in equilibrium the monitoring probability approaches zero. It i s o b vious that the principal is indeed better o d e legating her monitoring decision. The result depends on the fact that extreme rewards are credible, on the risk neutrality of the players, and on the (standard) assumption that players cannot side-contract. The last assumption will b e r e l a x e d i n t h e n ext section.
Since the agent will o n l y take the action a H if monitoring takes p l ace, the principal has to oer a c ontract to the supervisor which i nduces him to monitor. Recall that the contract of the supervisor cannot be made contingent o n m onitoring itself, because monitoring is not veriable. The principal can condition thecontract only on the revealed result of monitoring. As for the agent a c o n tract to the supervisor is a vector t (t H ; t N ; t L ).
5
In the game with delegation the payos to the players depend on the contract (w;t) and on the outcome of the subgame which is played by the agent and the supervisor. Given that the supervisor reports truthfully the payo functions of the principal, the supervisor and the agent are, respectively
5 Note that the supervisor reveals his result when t H ; t L t N . In the following, however, these two c o nditions will be ignored. The optimal contractt will be such that these two conditions are automatically satised. U S (w;t;;) 
where denotes the probability that the agent c hooses the action a H and represents the probability that the supervisor monitors. Then given a contract (w;t) a N ashequilibrium in the simultaneous move g a m e is a pair (;) such that We write N(w;t) as the set of Nash equilibria in the subgame induced b y the contract (w; t ). The outcome ( w;t; ; ) i s s a i d to be feasible if it satises the following constraints: U A (w;t;;) 0 U S (w;t;;) 0 (;) 2 N(w;t) w H ;w N ;w L ;t H ;t N ;t L 0:
Similarly, w e call a contract (w;t) feasible if there exists an equilibrium (;) 2 N (w;t) such that the outcome ( w;t; ; ) is feasible. A subgame perfect equilibrium outcome o f the game i s a s o l ution (ŵ;t;;) t o P 2 . P 2 : m ax (w;t;; ) U P (w;t;;) s:t: (w;t; ; ) is feasible, where we w i ll call the contract (ŵ;t) an optimal contract.
We derive the best responses of the agent and the supervisor in the simultaneous move g a m e induced by a c ontract (w;t). Given that the supervisor monitors with a probability , the agent's best response depends on the dierence in payos between the action a H and a L .
Lemma 3 Without loss of generality we may assume that the solution ( w;t;;) to P2 satisesŵ H 0ŵ L = 1 a=(), i.e. in equilibrium the agent is indierent between the action a H and a L .
Proof: Let the optimal contract w be such thatŵ H 0ŵ L < 1a=(), then the agent's unique best response is t o p l a y a L , i .e. = 0. The contractŵ cannot be optimal by assumption. Let the optimal contract w be such thatŵ H 0ŵ L > 1a=(), then the agent's unique best response is to play a H , i.e. = 1. The strict preference for action a H implies that @=@w H =@=@w N = 0. Therefore, dU P =dw H = 0dU A =dw H = 0 and dU P =dw N = 0dU A =dw N = 0(1 0 ). This implies that if w e l o w erŵ H and raisê w N at a proportional rate of (1 0 )=() then both the principal's and the agent's payo do not change. We therefore can lower w H t o 1 a = ( ) + w L a n d r a i s eŵ N b y a n appropriate amount in order to create a new contract w 0 . If the combination (ŵ;t;;) is a solution to P2 then also the combination (w 0 ;t;;) is a solution to P2.
Given the contract ( w;t) and that the agent takes the action a H with probability , the supervisor's best response depends on the dierence in payos between m onitoring and not monitoring. Lemma 4 Without loss of generality we may assume that the solution ( w;t;;) to P2 satisest H + ( 1 0 ) t L = c + t N , i.e. in equilibrium the supervisor is indierent about monitoring.
Proof: Let the optimal contractt be such that t H + (1 0 )t L < c + t N then the supervisor has a strict preference f or not monitoring. Since n o m onitoring induces the agent to play = 0 , t he contract (ŵ;t) cannot be optimal by assumption. Let the optimal contractt be such thatt H + ( 1 0 ) t L > c + t N then the supervisor has a strict preference for monitoring ( = 1). Note that the supervisor can only have a strict preference f or monitoring if h i s i ndividual rationality constraint i s not binding.
Furthermore, strict preference i m plies that if we l o w e r t H a n d t L o n l y slightly then (;) remains a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, we c an either lowert H ort L and create a new contract t 0 for which the combination (ŵ;t 0 ;;) i s a l so feasible, while r esulting in a higher payo to the principal. The combination (ŵ;t;;) c ould therefore not have been a solution to P2.
From lemma 3 and 4 it follows that the optimal contract (ŵ;t) i s a c o n tract which induces a m i xed equilibrium in the simultaneous move g a m e. The optimal contract (ŵ;t) is therefore such that there exists an equilibrium (;) i n the simultaneous move g a m e with = 1a
(ŵ H 0ŵ L ) and =
Note that the combination (ŵ;t;;) can only be a solution to P2 if it satises the individual rationality constraints for the agent and the supervisor, which are respectively,
and
Proposition 3 The principal can approximate the rst best payo y H 0a H by oering a contract (w;t) which species a wage w H tending to innity and a wage w N approaching a L . A s a r esult the principal can achieve a higher payo when she delegates monitoring.
Proof: Consider a c ontract which species t L = t N = w L = 0 , w N = ( w H a L ) = ( w H 0 1 a ), t H = c= and w H > 1a=. This c ontract induces a m ixed equilibrium (;) = (1;1a=(w H )). The reader m a y c heck that the combination (w;t;1;1a=(w H ) i s f e asible b y noting that the individual rationality c onstraints are satised in equality. The principal's payo is U P (w;t; ; ) = y H 0 a H 0 (1ac)=(w H ). If w e let w H tend to innity the principal's payo converges to the rst best outcome y H 0 a H . Q.E.D.
Two c o n c lusions can be drawn from the proposition: Delegating monitoring is profitable for the principal and there does not exist an optimal contract. We w i ll comment on both results.
There are t w o reasons why the principal can achieve a higher payo by delegating monitoring. The rst reason concerns the creation of incentives. The principal has to give incentives to induce the action a H and, at the same time, t o i nduce m onitoring. When the principal controls t h e m onitoring technology, there is only the contract w through which the principal can regulate both incentives. By delegating the monitoring process to the supervisor, she has two sets of contracts for creating appropriate incentives. From the equilibrium condition (7) we see that with delegation the principal uses the contract t to regulate the incentives for the agent and the contract w for creating incentives to monitor. B y d e legating monitoring the principal decouples the two t ypes of incentives and can regulate them more accurately.
A second reason is that in the game w i thout delegation the principal cannot commit herself t o r e v ealing the evidence a H when w H is larger than w N . A s a r e sult an optimal contract species w H w N . This lack o f c ommitment does not occur when m onitoring is delegated to the supervisor. In the game w i th delegation the supervisor makes the decision concerning the revelation of evidence. His decision does not depend on the contract w, l ike in the game w i thout delegation, but only on the contract t. The principal can, therefore, set w H larger than w N and use a c arrot and stick approach to discipline the agent.
Proposition 3, however, also tells us that an optimal contract (ŵ;t) d o e s not exist. For any contract (w;t) with an associated p a y o of y H 0a H 0" there e xists a contract (w 0 ; t 0 ) w h i c h h a s a p a y o larger than y H 0a H 0". Note, however, that the payo y H 0a H cannot be obtained in equilibrium. I t w ould require that the agent c hooses the action a H with probability one, while monitoring does not occur. There does not exist a contract (w;t) w h i c h induces s u c h a n e quilibrium. The equilibrium (;) = ( 1 ; 0) can only be approximated by a contract which s p e cies a w H tending to innity.
The result is similar to Border and Sobel (1987) . Border and Sobel analyze a m odel in which a principal tries to extract an agent's endowment, while this endowment i s p r i v ate information. Optimal policies in their model involve rewarding the agent for truthful reporting. They demonstrate, however, that if r e w ards to the agent are not bounded exogenously, a n o p t imal policy does n o t e x ist. The principal would like t o m onitor with an innitely small probability, w h i le promising innitely large rewards when the audit conrms the report of the agent. The high reward induces the agent t o t e ll the truth.
The result that oering an ever higher wage w H benets the principal is not realistic. It prompts us to question the assumptions of the model. In the literature two m odications have b e en proposed. First, Border and Sobel argue that it is unrealistic to assume that the principal can promise innite rewards. They argue that in reality resources are limited and this also holds for the principal. They therefore propose an exogenous upperbound on wages. This procedure, however, is rather a d h o c , b e c ause it creates the problem of nding a plausible upperbound. Second, Mookherjee and Png (1989) contest the plausibility of risk neutrality i n the context of the model. They s h o w that with only a s l ight degree of risk aversion innitely high wages are no longer optimal.
We propose a third approach and introduce the possibility of collusion between the principal and the supervisor. The next section argues that this is a natural extension of the model. A s w e will see, the threat of collusion creates an endogenous upperbound on w age proposals and its ultimate eect is therefore similar to Border and Sobel's assumption of an exogenous upperbound on rewards. The extension can therefore also be seen a s a m ore realistic interpretation of Border and Sobel's ad hoc upperbound on wages.
Collusion between Principal and Supervisor
Consider a contract which approximates the rst best solution. This means that the wage w H is large, w h i le the wage w N is close to a L . The probability that monitoring occurs is small, but strictly positive. Now suppose that monitoring does indeed o c cur and that it reveals that the agent's action is a H . If the supervisor reveals this i nformation, then the principal has to pay the agent the wage w H . I f the principal can convince t he supervisor not to reveal his information, then she only has to pay the wage w N and saves w H 0w N . For contracts which approximate the rst best solution this dierence i s l arge and the principal's willingness to pay to prevent revelation is high. We s a y that in this case the principal has a strong incentive to collude with the supervisor to prevent r e v e lation.
The idea of collusion is modeled as follows. After stage 5 of the game the supervisor reveals the evidence to the principal. The principal can then oer the supervisor a bribe b for not revealing the evidence. If the supervisor accepts the bribe, then collusion occurs. Collusion, however, is costly. A s a rational for this assumption consider that the bribe should not be detected and has to be transferred in stealth. In accordance with Tirole (1992) we assume that this cost is proportional to the size of the bribe. Thus, the cost of bribing can be expressed by a transfer parameter k 2 (0;1) with the following interpretation. When the principal sends a bribe of b monetary units, the supervisor receives only an equivalent o f kb monetary units. It is assumed that the value of k is common knowledge.
Note that collusion can only involve the concealment of evidence, not the articial creation of evidence. Two t ypes o f c ollusion are possible. E i ther the evidence a H or the evidence a L is concealed. Since with delegation a contract approximating the rst best solution involves w H > w N > w L , the principal will typically have a n i n terest in bribing when the evidence shows a H . In fact when t he evidence shows a L , the principal strictly prefers this t o b e r e v ealed. At rst sight this may induce the supervisor to threaten not to reveal the evidence a L , i f he is not paid more than the contract species. Such threats, however, are not credible.
Collusion between the principal and the supervisor occurs only if i t i s protable for both sides. The bribe b, therefore, has to be such that both the supervisor and the principal are willing to collude. W e calculate the maximum bribe, b max , the principal is willing to give and the minimal bribe,b min ,the supervisor is willing to accept.
By colluding the principal has to pay w N + t N instead of w H + t H . This means that collusion net of the bribebis protable if and only i f w H 0 w N + t H 0 t N 0 b > 0. The maximum bribe the principal is willing to pay i s therefore b max w H 0w N +t H 0t N :
(10)
The supervisor accepts a bribe if this i s protable t o h i m . Since a bribe of size b is only worth kb to him, h e w i ll accept a bribebwhenever kb> b min (t H 0t N ):
It follows that when kb max b min there does not exis t a b r ibe b 0 for which both the principal and the supervisor are willing to collude. 6 As a consequence collusion will not take place. A contract is, therefore, c ollusion-proof if i t s a t i ses the collusion-proofness constraint w H w N + K(t H 0 t N );
with K (1 0 k)=k.
Proposition 4 For any contract which is not collusion-proof the principal is w e akly bett e r o p r oposing a contract which is collusion-proof. There e x i s ts, therefore, an optimal contract, which is collusion-proof.
Proof: Consider a contract ( w;t) w h i c h does not satisfy the collusion-proofness constraint. Then it is common knowledge between the players that collusion occurs. All players therefore know that the state of the worl d H w i ll not occur. This implies that the relevant w age combination when the agent takes the action a H is a l w a ys (w N ; t N ). There is no direct commitment eect from delegating monitoring to the supervisor. In this respect the case k = 1 resembles t h e v e rsion of the model i n w h i c h t he principal does not delegate monitoring. However, the fact that the principal can regulate the incentives f or monitoring and the action a H more eectively when delegating monitoring still remains.
A subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the game w i th collusion is a solution to the following optimization problem: P 3 :m ax U P (w;t;;) s:t: (w;t; ; ) i s f easible (w;t) is collusion-proof. A contract ( w;t) for which the maximum is a c hieved is called an optimal contract. Before determining a solution to P3 we rst prove the following proposition. 7 The bribe kb should be added to the supervisor's w a ge t 0 N , s i n c e i t m i ght be the bribe kb, which makes the supervisor's contract individual rational.
Proposition 5 For any k 2 (0;1] the principal can achieve a strictly higher payo by delegating monitoring than when she monitors h e r self.
Proof: In the game w i thout delegation we found that the subgame perfect outcome was (w . Note, h o wever, that for the contract (w 3 ; t ) the collusion-proofness constraint is not binding. We can therefore raise w H and decrease w N , w h i le keeping the agent's payo constant. This procedure will cause = 1 a = ( w H ) to fall and will increase the principal's payo. It follows that the principal's p a y o is strictly h i gher in the game w i th delegation than in the game without delegation.
Proposition 5 shows that the principal can attain a higher payo by delegating monitoring even when there exist extreme c ollusion possibilities ( k ! 1). In these cases the commitment eect o f d e legation is very small. The fact that the principal can better regulate the incentives, however, remains. This causes delegation to be even protable when the commitment e ect does not exist.
Proposition 6 i) If > (1a 0 Kc)=ja H 0Kcjthen under the optimal contract ( w;t) the supervisor monitors with a probability less than one and the agent takes the action with probability one. The principal's payo is larger than y H 0a H 0c. Neither the agent nor the supervisor receives a rent.
ii) If (1a 0 Kc)=ja H 0Kcjand K =(1 0 ) then under the optimal contract ( w;t) the supervisor monitors with probability one and the agent takes the action with probability one. The principal's payo is less than or equal to y H 0 a H 0 c. T h e agent receives a rent, while the supervisor does not.
iii) If (1a 0 Kc)=ja H 0Kcjand K > = (1 0 ) then then under the optimal contract ( w;t) the supervisor monitors with probability one and the agent takes the action with probability one. The principal's payo is less than o r e qual to y H 0 a H 0 c. The supervisor receives a rent, while the agent does not.
The proof of this proposition consists ofseveral steps and is reserved for the appendix. The proposition shows that for the optimal contract the agent c hooses the action a H with probability one. There are three t ypes of optimal contracts. If monitoring is ecient (i.e. > (1a 0 Kc)=ja H 0Kcj) then the principal can set contracts in such a w a y that in the simultaneous move g a m e the supervisor monitors with a probability l ess than one. The individual rationality constraint of the agent and the supervisor are binding in this case.
When monitoring is l e ss ecient, monitoring must occur with probability o n e . T o induce the agent t o c hoose the action a H with probability o n e , the principal has to leave a rent to either the supervisor or the agent. When collusion is n o t v e ry costly (i.e. K < =(1 0 )), the principal prefers to leave this rent to the agent. In the other case she leaves the rent to the supervisor. In either case the payo to the principal is less than y H 0 a H 0 c.
Recall that a similar result w as obtained when we derived the optimal contract i n t h e game without delegation. Also there the eciency o f m onitoring determined w h e ther the principal was able to appropriate the entire surplus created b y the action a H . Note however, that the monitoring technology does not need to be as ecient a s i n the game without d e legation in order to extract the whole surplus, since (1a 0 Kc)=ja H 0Kcj< (1a + c)=(a H + c) for all K 0. This i s due to the eect t hat with delegation the principal can better r e gulate incentives.
Proposition 7 The principal's maximum payo is decreasing with the cost of collusion k.
Proof: For the solution (ŵ;t;;) t o P 3 w e found thatt H > 0 and that the collusionproofness constraint i s binding. By decreasing the variable k the collusion-proofness constraint i s r e l axed, which i ncreases the principal's payo.
The intuition behind proposition 7 becomes c l ear when one notes that an alternative way of interpreting the transfer technology parameter k is t o v iew it a s t h e d e gree o f commitment. If k is s m all then the principal can commit to handing out large rewards if it is observed that the agent took the high action. A larger k then reduces the set of contracts to which the principal can commit. In terms o f c o m m i tment the proposition then states that the principal can attain a higher p a y o when she is able t o c ommit to a larger set of contracts.
Collusion between Agent and Supervisor
One can extendthemodel further by adding another possibility o f c ollusion. By allowing the agent t o c ollude with the supervisor the set of collusion-proof contracts is further restricted. Let t he agent b e a b l e t o m ake use of the same bribing technology as the principal. At a proportional cost k he can send bribes to the supervisor. Again w e d o n o t a n a l yze the bargaining game, but simply assume t h a t i f t h e re exists a surplus from colluding, collusion takes place. We do not analyze how the surplus is divided over the three players. For simplicitely assume that the supervisor can only ask one player for a collusionairy oer. 8 In this case the incentives of the principal and the agent are mutually exclusive. I f the evidence shows that the agent's action was a H then only the principal will make an oer to bribe, since for an optimal contract it will typically hold that w H > w N . Likewise, if the evidence is a L , then only the agent benets from the concealment o f e v i dence.
We derive the collusion-proofness constraint of the agent. By colluding the agent prevents the supervisor from revealing the evidence a L . This i m plies t h a t h e r e ceives the wage w N instead of the wage w L . The agent's willingness to pay is therefore w N 0 w L . To the supervisor collusion is only protable i f h e r e ceives a t l east a transfer of t L 0 t N . Collusion between the agent and the supervisor is therefore not protable i f
Equation (13) is the collusion-proofness constraint with respect to the agent. Without lo s s o f g e nerality w e m a y assume that the optimal contract satises the collusionproofness constraint with respect to the agent. Suppose the optimal contract ( w;t) does not satisfy the constraint. Since it is in the interest of the agent and the supervisor to collude, bribing will o c c ur. This m eans that instead of paying the wage combination (ŵ L ;t L ) the principal will always need to pay the wage (ŵ N ;t N ). ) must therefore also be optimal. Note that the contract satises the collusion-proofness constraint.
A subgame perfect e q uilibrium outcome i s a c o n tract ( w;t) and an equilibrium pair (;) which m aximizes the following expression. max w;t;; U P (w;t; ; ) s:t: (w;t;;) is f e asible (w;t) is collusion-proof w.r.t. the principal (w;t) is c o l lusion-proof w.r.t. the agent.
The previous section showed that optimality requires that the agent c hooses the action a H with probability one. In equilibrium the supervisor does therefore not observe the action a L , w h e n h e m onitors. This implies that in equilibrium the principal never needs to pay the supervisor the wage t L . Consequently, she can set t L as large as she wants without aecting the payo of the players. It follows that the principal can costlessly prevent c ollusion between the agent and the supervisor. She oers the supervisor a large reward if he observes that the agent's action was a L . The reward is set in such a w a y , that there does not exist a surplus between the agent and the supervisor when they collude, i.e. t L k(w N 0 w L ) + t N .
Proposition 8 Allowing the possibility of collusion between the agent and the supervisor does not aect the maximum payo the principal can achieve. As a consequence the principal i s b etter o by delegating monitoring to a supervisor.
Proof: Let (ŵ;t) be the optimal contract w i thout the possibility of collusion between the agent and the supervisor. In the simultaneous move g a m e i nduced by the contract (ŵ;t) the agent chooses the action a H with probability o n e , i.e. Q.E.D.
Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed a principal-agent m odel with the possibility o f m onitoring. We h a v e shown that if the decision to monitor and the action of the agent are taken simultaneously then the principal gains by delegating monitoring. Delegation may b e benecial because of two eects. First, when the monitor and eort decision are taken simultaneously, the principal must create incentives to induce both monitoring and eort. By employing an external monitor she has an extra contract to h e r disposal and can better regulate incentives for monitoring and eort. We c all this the incentive eect o f delegation.
A second eect which m a y m ake i t benecial to delegate monitoring is c ommitment. If the evidence obtained by m onitoring is private information and can be concealed, then the principal can commit to a larger range of contracts when she employs an independent supervisor. We parameterized the degree of commitment b y i n troducing the possibility of collusion b e t w een the principal and the supervisor and showed that the principal's maximum payo is indeed i ncreasing with the degree of commitment. This second eect is the commitment eect of delegation.
As a logical extension we allowed the agent t o c ollude with the supervisor in a similar fashion as the principal and showed that the principal can costlessly prevent s u c h c ollusion. This result can be seen as an example of the rst theme i n T i role (1992), which claims that \Under some c ondition, there is no loss in designing organizations which d o not leave s c ope for collusion" (p.157). The form of collusion is, however, rather simple. Collusion takes p l ace after the actions have b e en taken and the monitoring evidence has been obtained. When the supervisor and agent can collude before taking their actions then more sophisticated collusion schemes may e m erge which w i ll be costly to prevent.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 6
In order to characterize a s o l ution to P3 note that the problem i s identical to problem P2, except for the addition of the collusion-proofness constraint. The collusion-proofness constraint puts a restriction on the dierence between w H and w N . As a result proposition 3 will no longer hold and an optimal contract does indeed exist. Concerning the lemma's 3 a n d 4 w e can say that the former l emma w i ll still hold, while the latter does no l onger need to hold. Lemma A . 1 Without loss of generality we may assume that the solution to P3 satises i)( w H 0ŵ L ) = 1 a , i .e. the agent is indierent in e quilibrium between the action a H and the action a L . ii)t H 0 (1 0)t L = t N + c ort H t N + c=^t L = 0 , i.e. the supervisor is indierent in equilibrium or has a unique best respon s e t o m o nitor. iii) w L = 0^t N = 0 Proof: For i) see the proof of lemma 3 and note that the procedure of reducing w H and increasing w N will not violate the collusion-proofness constraint. T h e refore we h a v ê ( w H 0ŵ L ) = 1 a . F or ii) c onsider the proof of lemma 4 and note that lowering t H might v iolate the collusion-proofness constraint and this causes l emma 4 to fail. The variable t L can be lowered without aecting the collusion-proofness constraint.
To prove i ii) note rst that @=@w N = @=@w N = @=@w L = 0 and @=@w L 0. Consider the combination (ŵ;t;;) witĥ w L > 0 which i s f e asible a n d c ollusion-proof, then the combination (w Since b y assumption @U P =@j 0, it follows that U P (w 0 ;t; 0 ;) U P ( w;t;;). Furthermore, we know that eithert H 0 (1 0)t L = t N + c or thatt H t N + c=. In both cases the supervisor's individual rationality c onstraint i s s a t i sed f or all t N 0. Since the principal's payo i s d e creasing in t N and lowering t N does not cause the collusion-proofness constraint t o b e v iolated, we know t h a t a c o n tract specifying t N > 0 cannot be optimal.
From the rst two parts of lemma A . 1 i t follows that an optimal contract d o e s n o t necessarily induce an equilibrium in the simultaneous move g a m e i n which both the agent and the supervisor are indierent about their actions in equilibrium and play a m i xed strategy. The third part of the lemma t e lls us that for an optimal contract the agent g ets punished as severely as possible when it is revealed that he took the action a L . F urthermore, i t i s o p t i m al not to pay the supervisor when he does not show a n y e v idence.
An important observation is that the collusion-proofness constraint m ust be binding at the optimum. Proposition A.1 For the optimal contract ( w;t) the c ollusion-proofness c onstraint is binding.
Proof: According to lemma A .1 we h a v e t w o cases to consider. Case 1: The solution to P3 i s s u c h that the supervisor has a unique best response to monitor. In this case it directly follows from the proof of lemma A:1 that the collusion-proofness constraint i s binding. Case 2: The solution to P3 is such that a mixed equilibrium is played in the simultaneous move game. Consider a contract (w;t), which induces a m i xed equilibrium, i.e. = 1 a=(w H ). If the collusion-proofness constraint is not binding, then w e can increase w H and lower w N . By increasing w H and lowering w N in such a w a y that the agent's payo stays constant, the principal's payo increases: dU P =dw H = c@=@w H > 0. 9 The contract i s t h e refore not optimal if the collusion-proofness constraint i s not binding.
Q.E.D. Q.E.D. Lemma A . 3 If the c ombination ( w;t;;) with = 1 is a solution to P3 then it must hold that = 1 .
9 Note that individual rationality i m plies that (1 0 )w N a L . S i nce a L > 0 i t f o llows that the constraint w N 0 will not be violated as long as the contract w is i ndividual rational.
Proof: We prove b y contradiction. Suppose that the combination(ŵ;t;;) i s a solution to P3 with < 1 a n d = 1 . F i rst note that by assumption = 0 cannot be a solution to P3. Second, suppose that 0 < < 1 then it follows from lemma A .1 and the assumption that 1y > 1 a that ŵ H < 1y: (A.1)
By raisingŵ H andŵ N by an " > 0 w e can create a new contract (w 0 ; t 0 ), which is also feasible a n d c ollusion-proof. We h a v e ( By (A.1) and the assumption > 0 the rst term on the right hand side is strictly positive. It follows that we c an always nd an " such that the whole expression is positive. T h i s i m plies that the original contract (ŵ;t;;1) is not a solution to P3.
Q.E.D. Lemma A . 4 There exists a solution ( w;t;;) to P3 which satises = 1 , i . e. in the optimum the agent chooses the action a H with probability one.
Proof: We derive a s o l ution (ŵ;t;;) o f P 3 a n d c heck that = 1 . W e k now that it i s optimal to sett N = w L = 0 and that the collusion-proofness constraint is binding. If the solution is such that the supervisor has a unique best response to monitor then it f o l lows that = 1 . L e m m a A .3 then tells u s t h a t = 1 . W e therefore need o n l y t o i n v estigate mixed equilibria. By lemma A .2 we h a v e thatt L < c = andt H c=. I n fact, ift H c=, then i t i s optimal to havet L = 0 . B y substitution we c an rewrite problem P3 as where (A.6) follows from the fact that w H 01a > w H 0 a H . W e conclude that U P (w H ) i s d e c r easing in w H and reaches its maximum at 1a= or where cK(w H 01a)=(w H (w H 0 a H )) = 1. Note that this i m plies that if A.4 is binding in the optimum then also A.2 or A.3 i s b i nding. We conclude that we m ust havê = 1 .
Q.E.D. If the optimal contract is such thatt H c= then the pure equilibrium = = 1 i s induced i n the simultaneous move g a m e . The principal's p a y o is U P = y H 01a0(1 0 )w N 0 t H , where (1 0 )w N a L and t H c=. U sing the fact that the collusionproofness constraint m ust be binding in the optimum, w e c an rewrite this a s U P = y H 0 1 a= +( 10 ) Kt H 0t H . The two constraints are t H 1a=(K)0a L = ((10)K) and t H c=. Note that the constraints can only be satised if (1a0Kc)=ja H 0Kcj. The principal's payo U P is i ncreasing in t H if and only if ( 1 0 ) K > . In this case the
